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As China continues to urbanise, it could damage a flourishing farming model in its villages 
When villagers in Wukan village (乌坎) in Southern China protested against illegal land grabs in 
September 2011, it highlighted a main source of tension in China: the displacement of rural Chinese 
by rapid urbanisation, sometimes done illegally. The Seige of Wukan was a case in point, where 
local Communist Party officials had sold communally held farmland – collective land - to 
condominium developers without informing the villagers, and had pocketed an alleged 1 billion RMB 
(US$156 million) from the sale. 
“In theory the land should be owned by the collective, and these days they are headed by popularly 
elected officials,” explains John Donaldson, Associate Professor of Political Science at Singapore 
Management University. “But you have different villages, and sometimes the elections work well and 
sometimes they don’t.” 
Donaldson adds, “There is this issue about what modernity means. Developing countries such as 
China see their modern futures as one that includes large scale industrialisation and farming, and 
high-tech industries.” 
 
 
Cities for cities’ sake 
High-tech industries require the concentration of manpower and infrastructure that is not available in 
rural areas, which perhaps explains Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s single-minded focus on 
urbanising China. "Urbanisation will not only drive tremendous consumption and investment 
demand, and create employment opportunities,” said Li at his first news conference as Premier in 
March, “but directly affect the well-being of the people.” 
Donaldson agrees that cities are agents of change, and that they are where innovations happen. 
“However,” he warns, “there’s also this ‘cities for cities’ sake’ way of urbanisation. When you do that, 
you have these megacities and ghost town provinces.” 
Tieling New City in Liaoning province, where Li was Provincial Secretary from 2004 to 2007, is the 
symbol of the “cities for cities’ sake” school of thought. Four years after they were built, the buildings 
in this spanking new city look just as new as the day they opened for business, and just as empty 
too. Li is well-known for his desire to have 70 percent of China’s population in urban areas by 2030 
from the current 52 percent. It is perhaps in this light that Tieling New City and numerous other 
empty urban centres should be assessed. 
“People seem to believe that once you have urbanised areas, jobs will come – I’m sceptical of that,” 
Donaldson tells Perspectives@SMU. “There seems to be a thinking that migrants will bring jobs 
instead of the other way around. I think there’s a disconnect in terms of the logic.” 
This way of thinking is perhaps borne of the desire to relieve the overcrowding in major metropolises 
such as Beijing and Shanghai where it is a case of “rural to urban”. By building new urban centres 
such as Tieling New City, authorities are trying to bring “urban to rural”, but one question sticks out 
like a sore thumb: how are these people going to feed themselves? 
“China already struggles with creating enough jobs just for the population growth alone,” Donaldson 
explains, “so taking people to the cities means you have to create lots of jobs, whether they are jobs 
in the formal or informal economy to accommodate all these people.” 
 
 
Agrarian capitalism with Chinese characteristics 
So if high-tech industries are proving difficult to develop in cities, what about the large scale 
industrialisation that Donaldson was talking about? Specifically, large scale commercial farming that 
is often described as “The Iowa model” – huge tracts of land with crops harvested by mechanised 
tractors. 
“The Iowa model is already happening up in areas with a low population density in the Northeast of 
China in Heilongjiang and Xinjiang in the Northwest, and in Inner Mongolia,” says Donaldson. “In the 
rest of China where you have very high population density, it’s very difficult to create an Iowa-type 
model. That’s one model, but what we’re arguing is it is possible to modernise agriculture without 
necessarily breaking up the land use rights system.” 
In a research paper The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Agricultural 
Modernization, Agribusiness and Collective Land Rights which he co-wrote with SMU Associate 
Professor of Sociology, Forrest Zhang, Donaldson describes how farmers are benefitting from the 
collective land ownership system by working with agribusiness. 
“We’ve seen innovative models where the collective rents out the farmland to an agribusiness, and 
the money gets distributed to the farmers, and they also get the right to a job,” says Donaldson. In 
such an arrangement, the farmer loses autonomy of what to grow since they become employees of 
the agribusiness. But because they are working on their own land, Donaldson describes this as 
farmers effectively “owning” their jobs. 
There are other types of relationships between agribusiness and farmers, including commercial 
farmers who cultivate cash crops on their own plot of land and selling them for commercial 
exchange, as Yunnan’s farmers have done by planting coffee for Nestlé. There are also contract 
farmers who sign formal agreements to sell their entire harvest for an agreed price. However, all this 
might not be possible without the peculiar system of land ownership and land use in China. 
“Because collective land ownership restricts village authorities from disenfranchising rural residents 
from their land,” wrote Donaldson in the research paper, “it also restricts companies from denying 
village residents jobs on company production bases. Without such a restriction, an enclosure 
movement led by agribusinesses could easily throw many farmers off their land and into the army of 
reserve labour.” 
“One thing we were surprised about was the norm of land use rights in China,” Donaldson explains. 
“We have seen legal occupation of land through urbanisation where the farmers are compensated 
properly; these are not illegal land grabs where people are not properly compensated or when some 
official wants to build a summer home.” 
 
 
Great leap forward…again? 
The current models of working with agribusiness stem from the fact that land is collectively owned, 
and the farmers’ protected land rights provide them with a “tool to resist pressure from companies” 
and prevent mass dislocation of farmers. If this system were to be dismantled for the Iowa model, or 
if more farmers were to be displaced by greater urbanisation, does it lead to more development and 
growth? In other words, does development require urbanisation? 
“China could continue on its current model of trying to modernise the countryside on a small scale 
and be a little bit organic,” Donaldson says, “although there will still be land grabs but it won’t be on 
this massive scale that Li Keqiang is thinking about by shifting from 50 to 70 or 80 percent 
urbanisation in just a few years.” 
“People talk about growth but what really matters is the distribution of growth: who gets the benefits. 
Looking at smaller scale models, for people who tend to have less formal education, they are 
restricted to participating in things that are smaller scale and lower tech. This form of agricultural 
modernisation featuring agribusiness, and in which farmers can participate, we have seen it work in 
many places. But where China goes from here is an open question.” 
 
